

**Macdonald, Iain, and Krzysztof Ziarek, eds.** *Adorno and Heidegger: Philosophical Questions*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008. 221 pp. \$21.95 paperback.

This collection of ten essays joins the handful of books and dozens of articles to have addressed the question of what philosophical significance might best be made of the curious relation between the works of Adorno and Heidegger. The intriguing affinity readily surmised in their shared interest in such overarching concerns as the question of metaphysics, the problem of modern technological rationality, the fragile thoughtlessness of subjectivity, or even the peculiar character of the work of modern art, is offset by the sheer lopsidedness of their engagement with each other's work: while Adorno wrote and commented extensively on Heidegger's philosophical project, the latter claimed late in life never to have read the writings of the former. This current collection thus represents an admirable effort at bringing the two thinkers into a series of productive proximities with one another while nonetheless implicitly—and, surprisingly often explicitly—drawing the limits to any further integration of their ideas.

The topics selected by the ten contributors resolve mostly into the three prominent areas where the continuities between Heidegger and Adorno are best detailed. And indeed these topics—art, Hegel, modernity—often complement and overlap one another. Thus Nicholas Walker's very fine essay, "Adorno and Heidegger on the Question of Art: Countering Hegel?," makes use of the spirit of Hölderlin's philosophy of art, in contrast to Hegel's, to suggest that Adorno and Heidegger share a post-Hegelian, aesthetically inflected, conception of reconciliation: "Hölderlin can describe art and the philosophy that attempts to illuminate it, in a very Adornian spirit, as a *paradoxon*, a kind of active service, or *Dienst*, that responds to something we have not created ourselves—something that is not simply 'the work of human hands,' but nonetheless needs such a response to be fully itself" (104). And though reconciliation is doubtless a key component of Adorno's conception of modernist art, Krzysztof Ziarek's probing essay, "Beyond Critique? Art and Power," advocates for a power opposite that of reconciliation: radical critique. Ziarek argues that central to Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory* is the relation of art to critique, and that art, especially in the guise of Adorno's treatment of aesthetic form, is primarily a phenomenon that calls into question the validity and extent of any and all forms of critique already available in social life. But just here it would seem most difficult to draw Adorno and Heidegger together, since Adorno explicitly faulted Heidegger's philosophy precisely for its absence of any concept or place for critique. Ziarek successfully shows how Adorno failed to appreciate Heidegger's attempts to radicalize the idea of negativity (or nihilation, *Nichtung*), and with it critique, beyond even the sphere of dialectics—and thereby perhaps tending toward Adorno's own negative dialectic. Ziarek thus delivers a wealth of insight complemented by intriguing interpretations of a substantive element in both Adorno and Heidegger, but only at the cost of discounting Adorno's own reading of Heidegger. This essay demonstrates what many of the contributors also acknowledge, which is the difficulty and awkwardness of bringing these two thinkers into more direct philosophical contact.

Four of the most fruitful essays succeed either by taking a longer view, or by narrowly focusing on a single term. Fred Dallmayr's "Adorno and Heidegger on Modernity," along with Josef Früchtl's "The Struggle of the Self Against Itself: Adorno and

Heidegger on Modernity," provide valuable aids for yoking together the overall projects of Adorno and Heidegger by presenting them within the enlarged contexts of Romanticism and Modernism. And yet, these valuable contributions owe their success to having widened the context to that of intellectual history. The field of intellectual history, rather than philosophy, may well be the most accommodating and illuminating locale where some substantive conclusions regarding whatever might be shared between the thought of Adorno and that of Heidegger could best be discerned. Alternatively, the path taken by Iain Macdonald in his "Ethics and Authenticity: Conscience and Non-Identity in Heidegger and Adorno, with a Glance at Hegel," and by Lambert Zuidervaart in "Truth and Authentication: Heidegger and Adorno in Reverse," is to proceed by carefully inspecting the deployment of a single term, non-identity and truth, respectively, in the hopes of thereby opening up correspondences, or productive contrasts, between Adorno and Heidegger. The value of this collection of essays lies not least in the obliqueness and variety of its approaches necessitated by the lack of any direct kinship between Adorno and Heidegger.

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**Moses, Dirk A.** *German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 293 pp. \$80.00 hardcover.

According to the first sentence of this book, the claim that "the Federal Republic of Germany has developed a healthy democratic culture centered around memory of the Holocaust has almost become a platitude." The accompanying footnote cites my book *Facing the Nazi Past*. I might, then, have reason to assume that Moses considers that book to have played its part in disseminating a view of Germany's relationship to its past that is now badly in need of revision. Moses provides this revision in *German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past*. In the final chapters, he provides a critical view of memory of the Holocaust in contemporary Germany; indeed he suggests that the Holocaust now stands at the centre of a secularized theological thinking. Implicit in this thinking is the notion that, while Christ died so that those who came after might live through his grace, the Jews died in the Holocaust so that the Germans might be redeemed from the sins of the Nazi past. On this reading, Berlin's Holocaust Memorial does not so much anchor memory of the genocide at the heart of public memory, as serve to free the Germans from the stigma and shame of the Holocaust. The Memorial has become 21<sup>st</sup> century Germany's redeeming "Persilschein"—at least for the "non-German Germans." Who are they?

Moses investigates one specific generation of Germans, the "forty-fivers," namely those born in the mid-1920s who came of age in the late 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s. While all members of this generation had experienced Nazism, they were not as caught up in it as older generations. Yet they felt the stigma of Nazism intensely, and sought, understandably, to free themselves of it. Here, a bifurcation occurred: while one part of the forty-fivers chose the path of jettisoning Germany's pre-1933 traditions as